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Abstract
We compare the consistency of choices in two methods to used elicit
risk preferences on an aggregate as well as on an individual level. We
asked subjects to choose twice from a list of nine decision between
two lotteries, as introduced by Holt and Laury (2002, 2005) alter-
nating with nine decisions using the budget approach introduced by
Andreoni and Harbaugh (2009). We nd that while on an aggregate
(subject pool) level the results are (roughly) consistent, on an individ-
ual (within-subject) level, behavior is far from consistent. Within each
method as well as across methods we observe low correlations. This
again questions the reliability of experimental risk elicitation measures
and the ability to use results from such methods to control for the
risk aversion of subjects when explaining eects in other experimental
games.
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11 Introduction
Measuring and controlling for risk aversion in the laboratory is a common-
place in many economic experiments. However, while risk aversion is a
relatively straight forward theoretical concept - where its extent is easy to
determine for a given utility function - testing for risk aversion in economic
experiments is less trivial. A large body of the literature suggests meth-
ods for as well as discusses problems with the elicitation of risk attitudes:
The interpretation of empirical results, in even the most carefully designed
experiments, is not nearly as clean and straight forward as theory would pre-
dict. Accordingly, to explain behavior, contributions in the literature rely
on notions of stochastic elements in individual choices (e.g. Loomes and Sug-
den, 1995, 1998; Loomes et al., 2002), model the eect of interdependence
between choice options presented (Starmer and Sugden, 1993) or capture
the idea of heterogeneity between (possibly types of) players (Ballinger and
Wilcox, 1997). However, this literature - despite its insightful considera-
tions - does not provide an easily applicable toolkit for the elicitation of risk
attitudes in a laboratory environment to overcome the problem of inconsis-
tencies observed in choice patterns of experimental subjects.
Harrison and Rutstr om (2008) address this issue of handling experimen-
tal data in a survey that reviews dierent risk elicitation methods and dis-
cusses ways to estimate risk attitudes. While this review compares dierent
elicitation methods and discusses specic characteristics of the methods, it
only compares (cross-sectional) aggregate information and does not compare
dierences in elicitation methods on an individual level. One reason for this
might be that several studies have found that individual as well as aggre-
gate dierences in risk attitude measurements depend on dierent elicitation
methods. Isaac and James (2000) compare implied risk attitudes of 34 sub-
jects that resulted out of choices made in a rst price auction and by using
the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) procedure,1 nding that experimen-
tal choices imply dierent risk attitudes. I.e., experimental decisions for the
same individuals using the two methods cannot be captured by the same
or similar utility functions. Their results indicate that the two methods do
not just serve as pure shifters of risk aversion within individuals: ranked
correlations (across individuals) are only around 39%. From a practical
viewpoint, this questions the usefulness of the methods to control for previ-
ously determined risk aversion in (other) experimental games. A number of
studies investigated measures of risk aversion within individuals, generally
1This procedure is used to determine certainty equivalents to a given lottery.
2nding that risk attitudes were not stable within individuals in experimen-
tal settings: Berg et al. (2005) found that implied risk attitudes depend on
whether individual decisions are measured using auctions for a risky or a
riskless asset. Hey et al. (2009) compare willingness-to-pay, willingness-to-
accept, BDM measures and choices over pairwise lotteries. They nd incon-
sistencies and in some cases even negative correlations between results of the
dierent methods within individuals. Anderson and Mellor (2009) compare
results of the method developed by Holt and Laury (HL, 2002) and survey
results on gambles (over job and investment choices), nding that except for
a small fraction of superconsistent (\consistently consistent", p.152) decision
makers, the methods did not provide consistent within-individual estimates
of risk attitudes. Comparing HL results and decisions over a decision they
refer to as the \Deal or No Deal game"(named after a popular TV show),
Deck et al. (2008) nd that decisions are not consistent and conclude that
one elicitation method is treated as an investment (HL), while the other
as a gambling decision. Harrison et al. (2005b) found that risk attitudes
measured using HL were unstable over a period of six months. L onnqvist
et al. (2011) also look at intertemporal stability using HL and a survey; their
results indicate that the assumption of stability is problematic and that the
predictive power of implied risk attitudes based on HL and decisions in the
trust game is low.
Each of these studies compare the results from one risk elicitation method
with the results from another choice setting (like an auction, a trust game
or a survey) from which risk attitudes can be inferred. Our approach diers
from this literature by comparing the results of two risk elicitation methods
(each applied twice) to measure within-subject stability over a short time
frame as well as cross-method consistency. Closest to our study is Dave
et al. (2010, in a study on a cross-section of the Canadian population), who
also compare the results of two methods, i.e. HL and an approach by Eckel
and Grossman (EG, 2002). They nd that implied risk attitudes of the two
methods dier (in the EG method more individuals are risk neutral) and
that HL leads to more inconstistent choices, particularly among individu-
als with lower mathematical skills. This literature indicates that individual
risk attitudes are not stable, and should be treated with caution when inter-
preting experimental results. While our understanding of risk aversion rests
upon the notion of an underlying utility function as an individual-based con-
cept, experimental evidence does not easily align with a utility function that
is independent of the method used and consistent over time. Following the
above research we take the idea of cross-method comparison as our starting
point and try to compare two risk elicitation methods. However, in order to
3have a measure of comparison at hand, we compare the consistency across
methods with their consistency within each method. Furthermore, we use
two risk elicitation methods for which the decision variable is the same, i.e.
an optimal probability over gains, reducing the potential for a bias caused
by a dierent decision variable.
In our analysis we nd (a) that both methods give a divergent picture of
the overall risk attitude of the subject pool, (b) that consistency of individual
decisions throughout the experiment is limited for both methods and (c)
that individual-level consistency decreases further when comparing the two
methods. These results conrm outcomes of prior research and call into
question in how far experimental results on risk attitudes can be used for
more than very general statements about decisions of the whole subject
pool. The observation is further aggravated considering that the internal
consistency is not much better within than across methods, i.e. the problem
does not only seem to be that measures depend on framing.
1.1 Desirable characteristics of a risk elicitation method
What are desirable characteristics of a risk elicitation method? Knowing
that not all individuals are identical, methods need to allow for heterogeneity
of risk attitudes in the population of experimental participants. Preferably
the choices observed using a method provide information about individual
subjects partaking in an experiment rather than a general statement about a
group of participants in a (laboratory) study. For example, it would be desir-
able if a method would allow researchers to classify participants into groups
of risk averse, risk neutral and risk loving individuals. A \perfect"elicitation
method would even enable researchers to make predictions about acceptable
risk premia of individuals for given choice options and (or) to estimate re-
liable coecients of utility functions for each individual. We will consider
these desired but pragmatic criteria when evaluating our results.
1.2 The Methods
While these desirable characteristics of risk elicitation methods are rela-
tively straightforward, they are usually not directly addressed in experi-
mental studies. Many studies are based on a theoretical framework of risk
aversion assuming stable individual risk attitudes. In contrast to this xa-
tion on the individual in the theoretical world, evaluations of experimental
results often only look at aggregate measures over a subject pool. One rea-
son for this might be that robust individual-level measures of risk attitudes
4are dicult to nd with the given methods. To see whether this is the
case we look at two methods that start from a theoretically similar idea of
utility functions, i.e. utility with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA),
in which the choice variable is similar for experimental participants, they
choose probabilities. Both have been designed to elicit risk attitudes in the
laboratory, i.e. they are somewhat laboratory-articial and do not directly
relate to real-life choice problems. Furthermore, we incentivize both meth-
ods such that they would yield the same expected value for a risk-neutral
decision maker. We replicate some results of the original studies and com-
pare their coecient estimates on an aggregate, full-sample level as well as
within individuals. We alternate the order of the methods and each sub-
ject makes the choices in both methods twice, alternating between the two
methods for each subject. This allows us to compare the results within each
method as well as comparing within-individual choices across methods.
The rst of these two methods is the one used by HL, which uses a menu
of lotteries (or multiple price list, MPL) with changing probabilities over
constant pairs of outcomes. For both options one outcome is higher than
the other and in all cases in the rst option the dierence between outcomes
is small while for the second option the dierence is large. In total ten deci-
sions are presented in the order where the probability of receiving the higher
payo is increasing both for the rst and the second option. As the variance
of outcomes for the rst option is always lower, the number of choices for the
rst option gives a measure of risk aversion. Furthermore, any utility con-
cept that is monotonic in probabilities given constant outcomes yields one
switching point from the rst to the second option. In their study, HL nd
that subjects are generally risk averse and that risk aversion increases with
the size of the stakes, a statement they rened in a second study (Holt and
Laury, 2005) after a comment by Harrison et al. (2005a). Since it's publica-
tion, HL's method has been used in several studies as it allows to determine
risk premia that experimental participants are willing to pay for experimen-
tal lotteries. HL can also be used to infer CRRA coecients. Despite the
(theoretically) straightforward design of the method and its popularity in
the literature, HL is not awless in the sense that it often leads to inconsis-
tencies, i.e. multiple switching points, which can be interpreted as relatively
broad bandwidths of possible risk premia - including ambiguity on whether
individuals are risk loving, risk neutral or risk averse. Furthermore, while it
is possible to test whether decisions revealed using the HL approach are com-
patible with a certain utility function with known parameters, HL's method
cannot (easily or non-numerically) be used to determine or calibrate such
a utility function of individuals. This, in comparison, is possible using the
5second method we employ. In a more recently proposed method Andreoni
and Harbaugh (AH, 2009) let individuals allocate a budget in each decision
over the probability of winning and the gain in case of winning, whereas the
alternative to winning is always an outcome of 0. The AH set-up allows a
direct calculation of a CRRA coecient from every decision taken, which
increases the number of observations that can be collected on one individual
during the experiment.2 We use AH as the method of comparison in our
experiment.
2 Experimental Design and Procedures
We use a within-subject design of individuals that make choices based on the
risk elicitation methods introduced by HL and AH. We analyze decisions of
78 experimental participants from a regular student population throughout
7 sessions. Participants were recruited online from the experimental subject
pool at the Queensland University of Technology using ORSEE (Greiner,
2004) and through announcements in tutorials. Some participants were
also recruited in common places at the university in personal communi-
cation; however, when asking students in person for participating in the
experiment, the same information was used for recruitement, including the
organizer (researchers at the School of Economics and Finance), average
earnings (around 20 Australian dollars) and time estimated to complete
the experiment (around 30 minutes). It was also pointed out to the stu-
dents that there would be no minimum payment for participating in the
experiment and participants were also motivated by potential gains of up
to 150 Australian dollars. It is worth noting that this recruitement of ask-
ing students personally to participate was somewhat less controlled than
common in many economic experiments. However, as we were interested in
within-subject comparisons and were still drawing from a relatively homo-
geneous student population, this was of minor concern for this study. The
risk elicitation methods were implemented in a computer laboratory using
a custom-made, java-based software. Upon arrival in the laboratory partic-
ipants were seated at computers, were asked to work through experimental
instructions and start the experiment. Instructions included examples of
how to make choices in the experiment and two test questions for each risk
elicitation method. Further help by the experimenter was available upon re-
2In comparison, the MPL of the HL method requires an individual to make several
decisions to infer bounds for such a coecient. Consequently, more choices are necessary
to have one risk attitude observation for an individual.
6quest of participants. When participants had passed the test questions, they
started the experiment, going through two rounds of 9 choices for each risk
elicitation method. The order of the risk elicitation methods was switched
for about half of our experimental sessions (we did not nd signicant order
eects across participant's decisions depending on the order of the methods).
After completing the experiment, participant's were given the opportunity
to change their earlier decisions for the experimental round that would be
chosen for nal payo. Finally, participants were given a questionnaire that
asked for some demographic information and student status. After students
had nished the questionnaire they were paid and could leave the computer
laboratory.
2.1 Holt and Laury's Method
In the design of the risk elicitation tasks we followed the design chosen by
HL and AH closely. Therefore, we just outline our approach briey here and
refer to the original papers for full detail. Furthermore, screenshots can be
found in the appendix. For the HL method, participants were able to see
a MPL and were asked to make choices separately for each row between a
pair of lotteries. For each further decision row down, the probability mass
on the higher payo increased by 10%, making the safer option A (i.e. the
option with a lower variance in payos) less attractive. Contrary to HL
we, however, left out the 100% option of the higher payo (i.e., we did
not include a choice in which one option is dominated), which reduced our
number of choices from 10 to 9 in each round. Over the two rounds we
played one set-up in which participants played over high (a dollar gamble
between 10 and 8 vs. a gamble between 19.25 and 0.5) and one in which
they played over slightly lower stakes (8 and 6.4 vs. 15.4 and 0.4). Both
payos are closer to the low than to the high payo treatment in HL. The
high stake set-up scaled up payos and therefore implied higher risk premia
for choosing the more secure option. However, the estimated bounds for
CRRA coecients remain at the same number of safe choices. Under the
assumption that a participant has a constant CRRA coecient the same
optimal switching (point) probability in both rounds is chosen. Table 1
provides an example of the low-payo set-up.
2.2 Andreoni and Harbaugh's Method
Similarly, we implemented the AH risk elicitation method following the orig-
inal approach. However, we did not use gambles over negative amounts, but
7Table 1: Multiple price list design by Holt and Laury
Option A Option B
p X 1-p Y p X 1-p Y
0.1 8 0.9 6.4 0.1 15.4 0.9 0.4
0.2 8 0.8 6.4 0.2 15.4 0.8 0.4
0.3 8 0.7 6.4 0.3 15.4 0.7 0.4
0.4 8 0.6 6.4 0.4 15.4 0.6 0.4
0.5 8 0.5 6.4 0.5 15.4 0.5 0.4
0.6 8 0.4 6.4 0.6 15.4 0.4 0.4
0.7 8 0.3 6.4 0.7 15.4 0.3 0.4
0.8 8 0.2 6.4 0.8 15.4 0.2 0.4
0.9 8 0.1 6.4 0.9 15.4 0.1 0.4
Individuals are asked to chose between Option A or B for each row.
restricted our experiment to positive gambles only. In the AH method par-
ticipants were able to see the probability of winning a certain amount or
receiving zero otherwise. The probability of winning was illustrated as a
green shaded area in a pie chart. The amount received in case of winning
was illustrated as a green shaded area in a bar chart that lled up repre-
senting the higher gain in case of winning. Participants were able to change
the probability of winning by moving a slider whereas every extra percent
of winning meant that the potential gain in the gamble would be reduced
by a (constant) price. I.e., increasing the probability of winning was costly
in terms of the amount won. While the gamble was graphically represented
on the computer screen, the probability of winning and the amount to be
won were also stated as numbers on the screen. Table 2 shows the maximum
amount that could be won with probability zero in a round and the price of
one extra percentage probability of winning. These combinations were each
presented to participants twice.
Finally, the design of the payo structure for the two methods was de-
signed such that the expected gain from the 18 decisions in each method for
a risk neutral decision maker was the same across the two risk elicitation
methods in order to keep both set-ups as comparable as possible.
8Table 2: Pairs of maximum gain and cost of probability
Round A B C D E F G H I
Maximum gain () 27.3 56 172 88 49.4 39.2 54.5 207 116





0.28 1.17 10.75 2.75 0.77 0.41 0.68 8.62 2.42
Individuals chose over p, facing the constraint that they will receive  pprice(p)
with probability p.
3 Analysis of replication and of aggregate deci-
sions
In a rst step we replicated some of the (central) results in the approaches
by HL and AH that were relevant for our comparison. Both papers consid-
ered deriving parameter estimates for a CRRA utility function of the form
U(x) = x1 r
1 r , as introduced in HL or similarly U(x) = x as in AH. In both
methods the probability chosen was the main choice variable of interest for
the analysis. For this utility function, HL grouped experimental decision
makers into categories of individuals with a certain risk attitude, based on
their coecient r. Although the method used by HL does not allow to di-
rectly calculate such a coecient, bounds of it can be determined by looking
at the switching points from more risky to less risky choices. These bounds
are, however, dicult to identify if individuals have more than one switching
point. Dealing with these issues, HL counted the number of safe choices that
an individual had made and categorized individuals into categories that this
number of safe choices would have implied if they had only a single switch-
ing point (SSP). Table 3 reports our replicated results for two payo set-ups
comparable to the low set-up of HL, as well as the original results in HL in
their two treatments with low and high monetary payos. The last column
contains the empirical distribution of CRRA coecients based on our AH
data to allow a comparison.
The AH risk elicitation method allows for a straight forward calculation
of CRRA coecients under the functional form as described above; we do
this for each decision that experimental participants take and report the
distribution of all the decisions by all participants based on the implied
9Table 3: Overall distribution of risk attitudes
Risk attitude
Number HL (repl.) HL (2002) AH
of safe (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
choices
Highly risk loving 0-1 r <  :95 1% 1% 1% 1% 5%
Very risk loving 2  :95 < r <  :49 0% 7% 1% 1% 2%
Risk loving 3  :49 < r <  :15 8% 5% 6% 4% 6%
Risk neutral 4  :15 < r < :15 29% 21% 26% 13% 61%
Slightly risk averse 5 :15 < r < :41 17% 23% 26% 19% 11%
Risk averse 6 :41 < r < :68 22% 19% 23% 23% 9%
Very risk averse 7 :68 < r < :97 10% 22% 13% 22% 4%
Highly risk averse 8 :97 < r < 1:37 4% 4% 3% 11% 2%
Stay in bed 9-10 1:3 < r 9% 4% 1% 6% 0%
The table shows the share of decisions that would be classied in risk categories
as proposed by HL. We include our replicated HL results (1) and (2), the results
from HL's original (2002) paper (3) and (4), as well as results implied by our data
about the AH method (5). Our stakes are higher in (2) than in (1), but both
correspond to the low stakes treatment (3) in HL's original approach, as they are
signicantly lower than in HL's high stakes treatment (4).
r-coecient.3 We do not replicate the full analysis by AH, who answer
ve questions on expected utility. Instead we focus on whether using a
CRRA framework with a simple utility function as characterized before is
reasonable. We conrm their regression results over all decisions showing
that budget allocations of the winning probability and the winning price are
approximately constant over the size of winning stakes. This indicates that
CRRA is a reasonable assumption. We do not continue replicating further
results reported in AH, as our main aim is to compare the two methods by
HL and AH. Doing so, we nd that the classication in terms of risk attitudes
of our subject pool when using the HL method follows a similar distribution
to the one reported by HL in their original contribution. Furthermore, we
can generally identify a noticeable degree of risk aversion in our subject pool
and also nd a tendency of (slightly) increasing risk aversion when the stakes
over which the lotteries are played increase. We also nd that coecients
calculated using AH's method provide results that indicate a higher number
3Given that in AH U(x;p) = px
 and x =  price(p)p, argmaxp U(x;p) =argmaxp
ln[U(x;p)] =

price(p)(+1), where  is the maximum gain in a period that can be chosen
with a corresponding probability of zero. As  and price(p) are known, for a chosen p we
can calculate  =

price(p)p   1, which can be transformed to r =    1.
10of risk neutral choices compared to results in HL, some risk averse choices as
well as some decisions that are risk loving. Analyzing the total distribution
of the results indicates that the two methods, despite drawing on a very
similar notion of utility functions and both being theoretically legitimate
risk elicitation procedures, do not provide with the same result. I.e., the
average risk attitude in HL is between slightly risk averse and risk averse,
while the average decision in AH is risk neutral (with a tendency towards
risk aversion). This is true despite the fact that the expected monetary
payo from participating in the experiment is the same across methods.
4 Analysis of individual decisions
In order to get a better understanding of these dierences in the results, we
try to analyze the decisions of our participants on a within-subject basis.
That is, since all of our participants made 18 decisions in each method,
we can analyze in how far each individual decided consistently within and
across the two methods.
4.1 Internal consistency of the methods
In a rst step we analyzed in how far individual participants made consistent
decisions within one risk elicitation method. We did so to have a benchmark
of comparability when looking across methods. For this, we used correlations
of individual decisions over the two rounds. For the HL method, the number
of safe choices made in the rst and the second period, which were used to
calculate CRRA coecients as shown in Table 3 gave a correlation of 55%
and a ranked (Spearman's ) correlation of 62%. We also considered a second
way to measure the degree of risk aversion for which we did not assume that
participants have a clearly determinable SSP, but calculated the average
risk premium within their farthest switching points. (This corresponds to an
approach described by Andersen et al. 2006.) These averages were correlated
at a level of 68% over the two rounds of HL. Figure 4 in the appendix also
provides a picture of the dispersion of the dierence between safe choices in
the rst round (over lower stakes) and the second round (over higher stakes),
indicating that there is a slight shift towards risk aversion, but that it is not
a one-directional shift.
As in the HL method the idea of a SSP from less to more risky options
is important, we also looked at whether assuming the general prevalence
of SSP was reasonable for our sample, and how many of the players with
SSP consistently chose the same number of safe choices over the two rounds.
11From our 78 participants in the experiment, 48 players had a SSP in both
rounds of the HL method.4 Of these, 22 chose the same number of safe
choices in both periods, although one of them changed the decision when
being able to reconsider their choice at the end of the experiment. Of the 22
(HL-consistent) individuals, 10 participants were in the risk neutral category
as introduced above and 12 were either risk averse or risk loving. Finally,
we also looked at whether participants wanted to change their decisions in
the round that was played for nal payout. However, in the HL set-up,
only 8 out of 78 participants wanted to change their decision indicating that
most participants had already made their best-informed choice before; one
of these 8 increased the number of safe choices, while all others increased
the number of risky choices.
To analyze the internal consistency in the AH set-up, we similarly rst
looked at correlations between decisions of individuals made between the
rounds. For this purpose we calculated implied CRRA -coecients for
each decision as described in footnote 3. These coecients showed correla-
tions that ranged between 15% and 60% for the same lottery (i.e. the same
choice over a corresponding maximum gain and price of an extra probabil-
ity of winning) over the two rounds. Ranked correlations were between 30%
and 57% across individuals.5 There was, however, no apparent relationship
between the stake of the lottery and the correlation between the two rounds;
that is, it was not clear how to identify which factors led to higher consis-
tency over the rounds. Figures 1 a and b illustrate these correlations for
each round.
In a second step we therefore tried to nd an individual aggregate for
the CRRA coecient over the dierent rounds. We did so by averaging the
coecients for each individual over each round. In order to nd out if such
an aggregation was appropriate, we tested for whether there was a positive
or negative relationship between the maximum gain and the implied CRRA
coecient. While we found that it did so for some participants, it did not for
most individuals. To get a better understanding of this ambiguous result, we
4The rate of individuals that had more than one switching point in our study is com-
paratively high, at least when compared to the other studies mentioned in the introduction
that used the HL method; they reported non-consistent individuals and non-SSP individ-
uals with shares between 2% and 9% of the sample. Our single round rate is higher than
this and our rate is further increased as we played the HL game over two rounds.
5The correlations of -coecients understates the correlation of probabilities chosen
over the 2 rounds, as small dierences in probabilities chosen over the rounds that are far
away from the risk neutral choice optimum are amplied. Hence, for comparison we also
looked at the probabilities chosen over the rounds; these are correlated between 40% and
63%.
12Figure 1: Correlations of decisions over two rounds of AH
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compared the t-values for the estimated  -coecients in regressions of the
maximum gain on deviations from risk neutral probabilities and regressions
of the maximum gain on the individual CRRA coecient with what would be
expected under a t-density for our estimation.6 We nd that the dierence
between the two distributions is statistically insignicant (t=-0.97) for the
deviation from the risk neutral optimum and marginally signicant for the
-coecients (t=-1.95). We take this as a fair approximation to treat the
CRRA coecient for AH as constant over the size of stakes and proceed by
averaging them. Figure 2 a and b illustrate the two comparisons between the
distribution of the estimated individual -coecients and a t-distribution.
Having done this aggregation, we compared (round) average -values
over the two rounds; they showed a correlation of 70% by individual and
a ranked correlation of 72%. In order to get a better picture of robustness
of the CRRA coecients, we also looked at whether participants changed
their decisions when being informed that a certain round would be selected
for nal payo. The result showed that { comparatively to the HL method
{ many participants (a total of 27) changed their choices. Furthermore,
the percentage change of those individuals that revised their decisions was
noticeable; on average, participants that changed their choices moved 12%
towards safer choices and absolute changes were 30%. Finally, we inves-
6Practically, for each participants we ran an ordinary least squares regression of the
form yi = i + i  i + i, using the 18 observations of each participant i, saved all
i estimates and compared the distribution of the estimates to a t-distribution (with 17
degrees of freedom). For yi we rst used p = popt   pi, where popt was the optimal
probability chosen by a risk neutral individual and pi the probability chosen by individual
i. Secondly, we also did the same analysis with yi = i.
13Figure 2: Comparison between the distribution of slope parameters
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tigated in how far using average CRRA coecients derived using the AH
method allowed us to reliably classify participants into broad categories of
risk averse, risk neutral and risk loving individuals. We therefore tested
whether the average CRRA coecient  was signicantly dierent from one
(or r 6= 0 using HL's terminology) using condence intervals of 2 within-
subject standard deviations. We found that only for 5 participants out of
the 78 the CRRA coecient  was signicantly dierent from one; i.e. from
our estimates these 5 participants were risk averse and all other participants
were approximately risk neutral.7
4.2 Comparison across methods
Finally, our data allows us to compare the two risk elicitation methods on
a within-individual basis. One way to do so is trying to make predictions
based on one method of how an individual would have made decisions in the
other method. Following this rationale, we used the average risk aversion
coecient derived using the AH elicitation procedure to predict how an
individual with this parameter would have decided in the HL framework.
We found that this would have predicted 76% and 75% of decisions in the
two rounds of the HL method, respectively. However, in this comparison any
individual that has multiple switching points (MSP) will have some incor-
rect predictions, despite the fact that the estimate used is not incorrect. To
alleviate this eect, we looked at individuals with SSP only, which showed
7Main reason for this is that for almost all participants the estimated standard deviation
on  is s.d. 0:3, as can be seen in Figure 5 in the appendix.
1483% and 82% correct predictions over the two periods, respectively. How-
ever, while this might seem like a high level of comparability, these numbers
have to be read with care, as instead of using the AH aggregate just guessing
all individuals to be risk neutral (although this is not what our aggregate
analysis suggested) would have predicted choices made by individuals under
the HL method equally well. We therefore reverted to the categorization of
participants into groups of people with dierent risk attitudes as in Table
3. We allocated individuals into these risk categories according to the two
methods. Using this approach, 10% of participants were grouped into the
same risk attitude category by both methods. Reasons for this are that the
AH method (on average) shifts risk averse individuals in the risk neutral
category (a shift of about 27%); however, the shift is not only in one direc-
tion (the average absolute shift is about 33%). Consequently, when looking
at the ranked correlation on allocations to risk categories the result is that
the two methods are (rank) correlated at about 38%. Figure 3 illustrates
this relationship.














The number of individuals at a point is indicated by the size of the bubble.
The line displays a corresponding linear t.
155 Conclusion
Using the risk elicitation methods developed by HL and AH, we tested their
internal and external consistency across and within individuals. We found
that within method correlations of about 60% to 70% of decisions between
periods could be established. Comparatively, cross-method predictions and
correlations were smaller and could only be established on an aggregate
level. Furthermore, the two methods did not necessarily seem to be pro-
cedurally invariant, both over the full subject pool (as visible in Table 3),
as well as on an individual level. This seems undesirable considering that
a priori one would have guessed that the two methods would yield sim-
ilar results and it seems dicult to determine a better method ex post.
Also, this puzzle does not seem to be rooted in the decision variable, as in
both methods individuals chose over probabilities. Part of the reason for
this procedural variance is that the AH method shifts decisions toward risk
neutrality. Ranked correlations are hence higher, at around 38% between
the methods, which is surprisingly close to what Isaac and James (2000)
found in their paper comparing methods. As most of the literature before,
we read these individual-based cross-method correlations as (somewhat un-
satisfactory) low; however, these low correlations are also due to the low
consistency of decisions for even the same procedure, which can be observed
in our within-method benchmark. Furthermore, we do not nd many super-
consistent individuals as, for example Anderson and Mellor (2009) found in
their study; i.e. at least in our subject pool individual inconsistencies are
an almost universal problem. While we have no clear means to determine
which of the two methods is the correct or superior one, from our results we
can evaluate in how far the desirable characteristics mentioned in the begin-
ning of the paper are met by the two methods. First of all, in the aggregate
both methods allow for making statements about the overall risk attitudes
of the subject pool and we would conclude that the subject pool is on aver-
age (moderately) risk averse. This conrms a general idea that on average
individuals prefer safe options to gambles. This conclusion is true for both
methods, although results using the method by AH would suggest that most
individuals are more centered around risk neutrality. However, while both
methods are able to make a statement about the risk attitude of the overall
subject pool, it seems dicult to be able to reliably infer the risk attitude
of an individual from the methods. While the HL method was more consis-
tent over the two rounds than the AH method, for both methods it seems
problematic to clearly identify the risk attitude of an individual. I.e., over
all 18 decisions in the AH method, it was not possible to identify more than
165 of 78 participants having a CRRA coecient signicantly dierent from
 = 0, although the overall picture suggests that there is risk aversion in the
population. Upon rst sight the HL method performs better on this ground,
but still only 22 participants make consistent decisions, and again for most
participants it is unclear whether they are risk averse, risk neutral or risk
seeking. This conclusion remains despite the fact we only repeated the HL
task over two rounds and one would conjecture that increasing the number
of repetitions might lead to more inconsistencies. Furthermore, much analy-
sis of the HL method relies on disregarding or simplifying many inconsistent
or mistaken choices that are observable in the data, which might not be
advisable, as a study by Jacobson and Petrie (2009) has shown. Finally,
it seems that both risk elicitation methods, despite providing some usable
aggregate results are not as good as would be desirable in determining indi-
vidual risk attitudes, which remain ambiguous for most of our participants.
Unfortunately, this eect is even severed when adding another risk elicita-
tion method, which shows that estimates are not method invariant. In our
study this was true both from a global point of view as well as on an indi-
vidual level. This is somewhat disappointing considering that risk aversion,
based on the notion of individual utility, is essentially an individual-based
concept. Without individual consistency of decisions, it is also questionable
to what extent HL (or AH) can be used for measuring to control for risk
aversion, as it is often done when interpreting other experimental games,
for example when analyzing trust or contributions to public goods, to name
just two.
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19A Information on subject pool








English Speaker yes 69
no 9
Experience with experiments yes 30
no 48
Marital Status Married 4
In partnership 28
Single 46
Weekly Income <$100 33
$100 - $199 23
$200 - $299 12
$300 - $399 5








Living Situation Living alone (renting) 7
Living alone (owning) 1
Living with partner 10
Living with your parents 45
Living in a shared house 12
Other 3






Figure 4: Histogram of individual dierences between the number of safe
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21C Examples of experimental screens
Figure 6: Screenshot from our experiment using HL
Figure 7: Screenshot from our experiment using AH
22